NF-PLURAL-OTHER Other pluralist / hybrid

Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment · Iason Gabriel · 2020

“it is very unlikely that any single moral theory we can now point to captures the entire truth about morality. Indeed, each of the major candidates, at least within Western philosophical traditions, has strongly counterintuitive moral implications in some known situations, or else is significantly underdetermined.”

why coded: All single theories counterintuitive or underdetermined - motivates pluralism · unit #15, pp. 424

Reinforcement Learning Under Moral Uncertainty · Adrien Ecoffet; Joel Lehman · 2021

“recent work in moral philosophy proposes that ethical behavior requires acting under moral uncertainty, i.e. to take into account when acting that one's credence is split across several plausible ethical theories. This paper translates such insights to the field of reinforcement learning [...] The results illustrate (1) how such uncertainty can help curb extreme behavior from commitment to single theories.”

why coded: Moral uncertainty implemented: multi-theory credence agents curb single-theory extremes · unit #1, pp. 1

“Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that any deterministic voting system which satisfies Pareto and IIA must be a dictatorship. [...] Thus, the standard approach in designing deterministic voting systems is to strategically break Pareto or IIA in a way that is least detrimental to the particular use case.”

why coded: Arrow forces principled sacrifice - no clean aggregation of theory preferences · unit #6, pp. 4

“we hypothesize that impossibility results imply a spectrum of plausible algorithms that cover the trade-offs among competing desiderata in decision-making under moral uncertainty. Which algorithm is most appropriate for a given domain may depend on particularities of the competing theories and the domain itself.”

why coded: Spectrum of algorithms across desiderata trade-offs - domain-relative choice · unit #7, pp. 8

Artificial Intelligence, Humanistic Ethics (Daedalus 151(2):232-243) · John Tasioulas · 2022

“This pluralism of values abandons the comforting notion that the key to the ethics of AI will be found in a single master concept, such as trustworthiness or human rights. How could human rights be the comprehensive ethical framework for AI when, for example, AI has a serious environmental impact beyond its bearing on anthropocentric concerns? [...] Being parasitic on compliance with more basic values, trustworthiness cannot itself displace those values.”

why coded: Value pluralism across well-being AND morality components · unit #1, pp. 235

Democratizing value alignment: from authoritarian to democratic AI ethics · Linus Ta-Lun Huang; Gleb Papyshev; James K. Wong · 2024

“this approach will treat an AI system as a jury comprising many moral modules, each responsible for evaluating response options based on evidence and its own system of normative principles. [...] Different moral modules will be given different weights, which should reflect the user's own value priorities. The weighted numerical scores from different modules are then aggregated to form a collective evaluation.”

why coded: Moral-jury architecture: plural normative modules + weighted aggregation · unit #2, pp. 15

Disagreement, AI alignment, and bargaining · Harry R. Lloyd · 2024

“According to MSEC, some AI ought to be aligned with some alignment target X iff aligning that AI with X would maximise expected choiceworthiness according to the group agent that represents the AI's stakeholders.”

why coded: MSEC: moral-uncertainty machinery (MacAskill/Lockhart MEC) socialized to stakeholder groups · unit #6, pp. 1765

“[Fanaticism:] imagine that the stakeholder group has 99.9% credence in the moral theory M1, and 0.01% credence in the moral theory M2. [...] MSEC implies that H is preferrable to G. Yet many of us intuit, to the contrary, that it would be better for our AI to select option G [...] it would be reckless and uncompromising for an AI to prefer H over G.”

why coded: Fanaticism objection to expected-choiceworthiness aggregation · unit #7, pp. 1767

Kantian deontology for AI: alignment without moral agency · Oluwaseun Damilola Sanwoolu · 2025

“Some philosophers have argued that we ought not align AI systems with any ethical theory as there is an absence of moral agreement. Since there are numerous ethical positions, how do we decide which ethical theory to turn to? [...] I reject the idea that the multiplicity of ethical theories provides sufficient justification for bypassing ethical theories as candidates for AI alignment.”

why coded: Rejects the no-consensus-so-bypass-theory move (contra the proceduralist retreat) · unit #2, pp. 5426

Agents, Alignment, and the Many Faces of Autonomy · Roberta Fischli; Matija Franklin; Arianna Manzini… · 2026

“Being strictly anti-paternalistic, the liberal approach posits that the AI agent should promote a user's stated preferences even when doing so reduces their well-being or undermines their autonomy over time. [...] The only reason an AI agent will refuse to act on a user's stated preferences is if acting on them would unequivocally inflict harm on others.”

why coded: Millian liberal framework as one of three rival normative designs (tentative) · unit #10, pp. 9

Normative Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Value Alignment (Dynamic Normativity) · Nicholas Kluge Corrêa · 2026

“it is impossible to compare ordinal preference sets with cardinal utility functions (deontological and consequentialist theories). [...] if we cannot extract a choice-worthiness value from ordinal theories [...] it is unclear how to use them in cases of uncertainty. [...] [and] the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. [...] To address the problems above, we will focus on aggregating human preferences expressed as ordinal sets in this study.”

why coded: Ordinal-only aggregation to dodge intertheoretic comparisons - same formal move as the dissertation's ordinal convergence · unit #11, pp. 86

No value alignment without control · Björn Lundgren · 2026

“If consequence-based theories are doomed, then what about deontological ethics or right-based theories? [...] threshold deontologists hold that if the consequences are too severe, then the permissible or right actions are determined on consequentialist grounds. However, as we saw, consequentialism will not succeed. Hence, we need to avoid threshold deontology in favor of some absolutist form of deontology. However, the problem with absolutist deontology is simply that an action can be deemed permissible—or even obligatory—in the face of devastating consequences.”

why coded: Systematic elimination of single frameworks as alignment targets · unit #9, pp. 7

The value alignment problem in advisory AI: a systematic literature review · Loukas Triantafyllopoulos; Evgenia Paxinou; Diama… · 2026

“Preference-based approaches adopt an individualist model focused on reflecting users' subjective values. Normative approaches prioritize shared principles and institutional standards. Fairness- and culture-oriented strategies extend this by foregrounding collective identities and historical inequalities. Rather than privileging a single paradigm, alignment theory benefits from a pluralistic perspective.”

why coded: Three coexisting alignment logics needing pluralistic integration - the review's own pluralism call · unit #3, pp. 15