AG-CONSTRAINED Morally constrained not accountable

Kantian deontology for AI: alignment without moral agency · Oluwaseun Damilola Sanwoolu · 2025

“a morally good action can occur without full moral agency. This distinction is particularly relevant when considering artificial intelligence. AI systems can be designed to act in accordance with moral guidelines without possessing the capacity for independent moral reasoning.”

why coded: Morally good action without moral agency - the key decoupling · unit #6, pp. 5429

“some scholars such as Talbot et. al argue that AI systems should not be held to deontological standards at all, on the grounds that deontology, unlike consequentialism, requires moral agency. [...] I agree with the diagnosis that AI systems are not moral agents [...] However, I reject the prescription that follows namely, that this rules out the application of deontological principles to AI design and behavior.”

why coded: Rejects Talbot: no moral agency need not preclude deontological evaluation of AI · unit #9, pp. 5429

“while AI systems cannot be Kantian agents, they can still be guided by deontological principles, particularly through simulation. [...] The key shift is from holding AI morally accountable to holding them morally constrained. AI can simulate the process of acting on maxims and testing them for universalizability, functionally resembling Kantian deliberation even if they do not act from duty.”

why coded: Constrained-not-accountable, the thesis in one line; simulation of maxim-testing · unit #10, pp. 5430

Disentangling AI Alignment: A Structured Taxonomy Beyond Safety and Ethics · Kevin Baum · 2026

“We sidestep these concerns by (1) defining ethicality relative to an externally defined moral standard X (acknowledging its possible imperfection) and (2) focusing on observable AIA behavior rather than internal moral agency: An AIA's X-ethicality is a strictly monotonically increasing function of the proportion of its behavior under all intended application contexts consistent with moral standard X.”

why coded: X-ethicality: behavior-relative-to-external-standard, sidestepping moral agency - same decoupling as Sanwoolu · unit #2, pp. 162

Wide reflective equilibrium in LLM alignment: bridging moral epistemology and AI safety · Matthew Brophy · 2026

“[Since] MWRE presupposes autonomous will, it cannot be applied to LLMs as if they had intrinsic moral character – MWRE must be understood as operating as an externalized, computational control structure. In this framework, the 'moral agent' capable of seeking equilibrium [is the human-institutional pipeline].”

why coded: MWRE as externalized control structure; the equilibrium-seeker is the human pipeline, not the model · unit #12, pp. 10

Agency and alignment: toward a normative architecture for human-AI interaction · Saša Josifović; Jörg Noller · 2026

“By viewing AI not as an autonomous subject but as a teleological extension of human purposiveness, we recognize its function as an embedded mediator of action. At the same time, this integration must be situated within a framework of practical autonomy—the human capacity to respond to reasons, to act under self-given principles and norms, and to assume responsibility within shared justificatory structures.”

why coded: Teleological extension of human purposiveness + practical autonomy - agency stays human · unit #3, pp. 2

Artificial moral characters: constitutional AI and the challenge of alignment · Jörg Noller · 2026

“(i) Cognition is distributed. [...] AI systems participate in these enactments by shaping linguistic and practical affordances; they are not subjects of morality but media of moralisation.”

why coded: 'Not subjects of morality but media of moralisation' - the sharpest formulation of the constrained-not-accountable position · unit #4, pp. 11